Upon his arrival from Hong Kong on March 11, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was arrested at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila, with national authorities assisting the International Criminal Police Organization in enforcing the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest order for the former president’s alleged crimes against humanity. The warrant is based on 43 specific cases related to allegations of extrajudicial killings committed under Duterte’s leadership, which also reportedly occurred under the supervision of law enforcement officers and with the assistance of non-police personnel. These alleged killings date from Duterte’s time as mayor of the southern city of Davao and his first three years as president, until 2019, when Duterte withdrew the Philippines from the ICC.
The legal proceedings against Duterte will take months to unfold—a hearing to confirm the charges is not expected until September 2025. Nevertheless, as he awaits his verdict in the Hague, his detention will have considerable implications for Philippine politics, especially with the upcoming mid-term elections, which include elections for 12 members of the 24-member senate, in May. The results of those elections could, in turn, augur a future shift in foreign policy back toward the more pro-China posture taken under Duterte.
Deepening Fault Lines between Marcos and Duterte
The upcoming mid-term elections will be held as the rift between current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and former president Duterte’s camp widens beyond repair. The two families competed in the 2022 presidential election as a united front, with Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of a former president, running on the presidential ticket, and Sarah Duterte-Carpio, the daughter of another former president, running on the vice-presidential ticket.
Despite this initial show of unity, the fault lines between them began to open up within a few months of their electoral victory. The first major indication of the split was when Duterte-Carpio insisted that Marcos Jr. give her the position of secretary of national defence; instead, she was given the cabinet role of secretary of education. The divide became more apparent in early 2024, when former president Duterte led a series of rallies in Davao City and accused Marcos Jr. of being a drug addict and a weak leader.
In June 2024, the vice president resigned from her position as education secretary, after which the House of Representatives held a series of hearings related to her alleged mismanagement of public funds. At that point, it had become clear that the two families were engaging in open rivalry for national influence. The rivalry got especially ugly when Duterte-Carpio threatened to have the president, First Lady Liza Araneta Marcos, and the president’s cousin, Speaker of the House Martin Romualdez, assassinated.
On February 5, 2025, the House of Representatives impeached Sara Duterte, with 240 lawmakers backing a complaint based on multiple issues, including the misuse of public funds, allegations of plotting murder, and the betrayal of public trust. Although the articles of impeachment were forwarded to the Philippine senate that same day, the senate trial is not likely to begin until July. Facing criticism from the lower house, Senate President Francis Escudero cited procedural reasons as the cause of delays. However, it seems likely that the trial is being postponed to ensure that senators will not be exposed to political pressure prior to the May mid-term elections, as this may influence their decisions in ways that go beyond the merits of the case.
Polarizing Public Opinion
With the former president’s ICC trial now in motion, these events have further divided Filipino public opinion, particularly in the digital sphere. Filipinos who are supportive of the ICC trial celebrated online what they saw as a day of righteousness for the estimated 30,000 Filipinos allegedly killed in Duterte’s drug wars, both as mayor of Davao City and as president. The victims’ families also welcomed his arrest as an important step towards justice and accountability.
However, supporters of the Dutertes have leveraged social media to fight back, taking out paid advertisements and co-ordinating activities to augment the online discourse and portray the arrest as a political kidnapping. According to an investigative report by the news organization Rappler, dubious user profiles on various social media platforms have posted co-ordinated messages in copy-paste form aimed at delegitimizing the Supreme Court and the media. A news analysis by The Nerve showed that on March 11-12—immediately following Duterte’s arrest—43 per cent of the social media posts in the Philippines supported Duterte.
However, such online disinformation campaigns are being challenged by scientific public opinion surveys that tell a different story. For instance, based on a Stratbase Consultancy-commissioned Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey conducted from February 15 to 19, 51 per cent of respondents said they support holding the former president responsible for his alleged extrajudicial killings, while only 25 per cent did not. Nevertheless, the growing polarization of domestic public opinion and the exploitation of the digital space will likely play a role in this year's senatorial elections.
According to another recent SWS survey conducted from January 17 to 20, the Marcos Jr. administration’s “Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas” (Alliance for a New Philippines) senatorial slate continues to lead the race, with eight of its candidates positioned favourably to win one of the 12 seats being contested. However, with growing negative sentiments being expressed on social media regarding the former president’s detention, there are concerns among members of the Marcos-backed alliance that they could lose supporters because of their affiliation with the current president – even though half of the candidates endorsed by Marcos Jr.’s team were openly against the ICC’s investigation into the extrajudicial killings under the Duterte administration’s war on drugs.
The China Angle
Along with domestic political implications, the May elections also have a crucial foreign policy dimension. The Dutertes are accused by their critics of appeasing China and have advocated for closer relations with the country. Many critics see Rodrigo Duterte as openly undermining the Philippines' sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea and rejecting security co-operation with the U.S. and other Western partners, to the Philippines’ detriment. Similarly, his daughter, the current vice president, has never made any statement condemning China’s coercive and expansionist activities in Philippine waters since she took office. Unsurprisingly, when news broke of Duterte's arrest, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly issued a strong statement of condemnation, invoking the narrative that the process was solely politically motivated. Despite Beijing’s sensitivities to foreign interference in its domestic affairs, it showed no restraint in raising its voice against recent developments in Philippine politics.
Beijing has been frustrated by the strong stand Marcos Jr. has taken in defending the West Philippine Sea, including by leveraging Manila's increasingly strong defence partnerships with its traditional ally, the U.S., and like-minded regional partners. Chinese media often portray Marcos Jr.'s pivot away from Duterte's so-called "status quo policy" on the West Philippine Sea as having caused instability. Moreover, the Chinese media often depict Marcos Jr. as a “proxy” of the U.S. while presenting Duterte as a righteous leader who knew how to “resist” foreign interference. There have been reports from Philippine news agencies such as PressOne.Ph about an increase in China-linked online disinformation operations to discredit the current administration’s foreign policy and to suggest that Manila is openly allowing Washington to interfere in its domestic politics. While such propaganda is not new, the timing and frequency of these posts, if effective, could sway public opinion against Marcos Jr.’s preferred senate candidates as election day nears.
Marcos Jr., in playing to the "China factor," has strongly urged Filipinos to vote for candidates who would help ensure that the Philippines not gravitate once again towards being a "province of China"—a reference to a suggestion made by Duterte in February 2018, while he was president, to make the Philippines one of China’s provinces. The Marcos Jr. administration has successfully portrayed the security of the West Philippine Sea as a national issue. The nationwide SWS survey from February 15-19 reinforces this point, illustrating that eight out of 10 Filipinos said they would not vote for a pro-China candidate in the mid-term elections. However, one cannot discount the possibility that at least in some cases, the recent ICC arrest may create more divisions among the public.
Given that several of the Marcos Jr. administration’s senatorial candidates have also shown some degree of support for the former president, if the impeachment process fails, the vice president may be in the position to rally support for a 2028 presidential bid by leveraging a narrative of sympathy for her family as victims of political persecution. If she succeeds in doing so and goes on to win the presidency, the result will likely be a significant shift back to appeasing China and relying less on like-minded Western partners in maritime security matters. Additionally, she may use the platform to seek vengeance on her family’s political opponents, similar to what her father did during his term.
Conclusion
The Marcos Jr. administration is trying to remain vigilant and proactive in ensuring that existing co-operation frameworks become regularized and operational to avoid foreign policy discontinuity in the long term. The results of the upcoming mid-term elections will not only provide an empirical evaluation of how impactful the former president’s arrest has been in shaping the political consciousness of Filipino voters, but it will also serve as a vital stepping stone in assessing the long-term foreign policy prospects of the Southeast Asian nation in a region that continues to be defined by the polarizing dynamics of U.S.-China power competition.
• Edited by Erin Williams, Senior Program Manager, Asia Competencies, APF Canada.
