The Indian Ocean is India's economic lifeline: 95 per cent of its trade by volume and 68 per cent of its trade by value transits through these waters. As the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) grows in strategic and economic importance, India is prioritizing efforts to fortify the region’s stability. With China expanding its presence and the Indo-Pacific emerging as a critical arena of global competition, India is enhancing its capabilities and asserting itself as the IOR’s pre-eminent "net security provider."
In assuming such a role, India is signalling that it views ensuring security and stability in the IOR as its unique responsibility. However, being a net security provider requires New Delhi to abandon some of its traditional caution and shift to a more assertive stance, driven by its need to safeguard its maritime interests, counterbalance China’s growing influence, and foster co-operation with partners to uphold a rules-based international order.
What does it mean for India to be a ‘net security provider’?
The term “net security provider” was introduced in 2009 by then-U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates. Initially, India hesitated to adopt this role to preserve its non-aligned stance and strategic autonomy — that is, freedom from great power influence — and to avoid provoking its neighbours, particularly China. However, over the past decade, this hesitation has waned as India has begun focusing more on securing vital sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), the strategic arteries of global trade. Being a net security provider entails patrolling vast maritime territories, managing regional crises, conducting anti-piracy operations, and ensuring the safety of key shipping routes.
India’s proactive engagement in the IOR is partly a response to China's expanding presence, which now extends from mainland China to the Middle East and Africa. In 2005, this presence was characterized in the "string of pearls" theory as the strategic encirclement of India. New Delhi responded in 2011 (although not officially) with its "necklace of diamonds" strategy, emphasizing naval co-operation with regional powers, expanding naval bases, and forging strategic partnerships. Although India did not officially declare itself a net security provider until December 2023, its trajectory has been evident for years.
The U.S. was one of the first countries to acknowledge India's growing military capabilities and its navy as a credible regional security force. In the early 1990s, Washington invited India to conduct joint military exercises — an indication that the two countries’ interests in the maritime security domain were beginning to align, especially in maintaining an open international commons, including in the South China Sea, and supporting a "rules-based order and regional security architecture" in the Indian Ocean.
How have India’s naval operations expanded?
In asserting a greater role in the Indian Ocean, India has reinforced its anti-piracy operations and expanded its naval presence across the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and Bay of Bengal. It has also expanded the remit of its coast guard. This includes transforming its maritime strategy from coastal defence to a proactive role in maintaining maritime order through policing, patrols, and surveillance. For example, it has ramped up its anti-piracy operations in response to the spike in piracy in the Middle East and Africa. In March 2024, the Indian Navy's 100-day anti-piracy mission east of the Red Sea culminated in the capture of 35 Somali pirates. As a leading naval force in the Gulf of Aden and northern Arabian Sea, New Delhi has also focused on securing key shipping chokepoints around the Arabian Peninsula, Indonesian archipelago, and southern Africa. Since 2008, its naval ships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions and to protect commercial vessels.
India’s commissioning of its first artificial intelligence-enabled warship, the INS Surat, alongside the INS Nilgiri warship and INS Vaghsheer submarine, marks a strategic milestone in the country’s naval capabilities and commitment to defence indigenization.
INS Surat’s AI features, which enhance its predictive maintenance, autonomous navigation, and hazard analysis, bolster operational efficiency and maritime security while reducing human error. However, with China’s naval fleet outnumbering India’s three to one, New Delhi will have to expedite production and accelerate technological integration to sustain its strategic edge in the IOR.
India has also become a linchpin in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) across the Indian Ocean. In September 2024, it launched Operation Sadbhav to provide HADR to flood-hit Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Similarly, India maintains its HADR commitment with exercises such as the Annual Joint HADR Exercise and Operation Tiger Triumph with the U.S., under the Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) policy, which strengthens maritime partnerships through information-sharing and infrastructure development.
The Indian Navy’s Operation Vanilla in 2020 in Madagascar exemplified its readiness for HADR missions, while the mission-based deployments strategy since 2017 has expanded its engagement in hotspots across the Indian Ocean and with regional navies beyond India's immediate vicinity, highlighting its role in collaborative security efforts.
Furthermore, India is increasing its maritime domain awareness, which refers to monitoring and understanding maritime activities to enhance security, safety, and economic interests through regional co-operation and surveillance networks. To achieve this, India is fostering regional co-operation through ‘white’ shipping agreements — that is, agreements that involve exchanging information about the movement and identity of non-military commercial vessels — and deploying coastal surveillance radar networks across the Indian Ocean islands and the Bay of Bengal.
What are India’s key strategic alignments in the Indian Ocean?
India must navigate a web of regional rivalries, shifting alignments, and intricate power dynamics to achieve its geopolitical ambitions. While the inauguration of the airstrip and jetty on the islands of Agaléga in Mauritius was a triumph for Indian diplomacy and security, it was also fraught with complications. Small, post-colonial nations such as Mauritius are particularly sensitive about sovereignty issues. In the Seychelles, a naval base deal has been stalled since facing pushback due to local concerns around foreign military presence, sovereignty, and transparency, underscoring the delicate nature of geopolitical manoeuvring in the IOR.
At the same time, India has expanded its influence eastward through its “Act East Policy.” India's deepening ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is helping to expand its maritime influence in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region. Since 1995, the India-ASEAN dialogue partnership has supported ambitious projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project connecting the seaport of Kolkata to Sittwe Port in Myanmar. More recently, the inaugural India-ASEAN maritime exercise in May 2023 and India’s subsequent deployment of three warships to the South China Sea in May 2024 reflect India’s growing maritime assertiveness and its commitment to a rules-based international order.
Developments in the South China Sea, a critical maritime zone, further highlights India’s strategic priorities in the region. As tensions escalate, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam increasingly see India as a valuable security partner. For India, the South China Sea is crucial for advancing its Act East Policy and countering China's Indian Ocean ambitions. With half of India’s foreign trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, secure navigation is vital for its economic security. In June 2023, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Filipino counterpart, Enrique Manalo, urged China to comply with the 2016 ruling countering Beijing’s South China Sea claims. This marked a notable departure from India’s previous neutrality in the region.
India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is further bolstered by its participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), alongside Australia, Japan, and the United States. The QUAD complements India’s SAGAR vision by promoting co-ordinated security efforts, enhanced disaster response mechanisms, and the preservation of a free and open Indo-Pacific. These alliances enable India to extend its strategic reach, balancing its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean with broader aspirations in the Indo-Pacific.
What challenges does India face in shifting its strategic posture in the IOR?
India’s ability to achieve its ambitious goals in the IOR is hindered by several significant challenges. One is budgetary constraints. Despite the growing importance of maritime security, India’s naval budget remains modest, amounting to approximately C$7.61 billion (INR 47,590 crore) for 2022-23, the lowest among India’s armed services and significantly inadequate for its vast maritime responsibilities.
While the Indian government aims to integrate shipbuilding with defence, persistent deficiencies plague the sector, with shipbuilding costs lagging behind global standards and state-owned shipyards plagued by delays and overruns. While India has made strides with indigenous projects, such as its aircraft carriers, technical and organizational challenges limit the navy’s ability to achieve full self-reliance.
India also faces significant capability gaps. Its 70,000-person navy is dwarfed by China's 240,000 active maritime forces. Similarly, India's submarine fleet, comprising 16 vessels, including one ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a diesel-electric attack submarine, pales in comparison to China's fleet of over 70 submarines, including seven SSBNs, 12 nuclear-attack submarines, and more than 50 diesel-attack submarines. Bridging this gap will require significant investment and modernization.
Another challenge for India is balancing the imperative to strengthen its partnerships with Western powers with preserving its strategic autonomy. India's aspiration to have a more robust presence in the IOR is tempered by a stark reality: the significant capability gap with China. While New Delhi aims to position itself as a net security provider, meeting its ambitions could necessitate closer alignment with the U.S. and other Western powers, which can help New Delhi enhance its military capabilities. Such co-operation could include joint military exercises, intelligence-sharing, and arms procurement.
While these collaborations provide essential resources and advanced technologies, they also risk undermining India’s traditional stance of non-alignment and independent foreign policy. Striking the right balance between leveraging Western partnerships and preserving strategic autonomy will remain a complex task for India.
The author thanks Dr. James Boutilier, former Special Advisor (Policy) at Canada’s Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, for sharing his valuable insights and expertise on the subject matter.
• Edited by Erin Williams, Senior Program Manager, Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President Research & Strategy, and Ted Fraser, Senior Editor, APF Canada
