The Philippines, positioned on the frontlines of China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia, is Canada’s key regional partner in upholding international law and the rules-based order. As tensions escalate between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has strengthened Manila’s ties with Washington. He has also increased the Philippines’ participation in U.S.-led partnerships aimed at bolstering joint military and maritime operations to counter Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. On March 7, 2025, Ottawa and Manila finalized the negotiations of the Canada-Philippines Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), a defence pact designed to strengthen military co-operation between the two countries through joint training and combat exercises.
Despite Marcos Jr.'s popularity in the West, including Canada, the president is facing domestic political challenges. His administration’s failure to address the rising costs of living is reflected in the decline of the president’s public support, with Marcos Jr.’s approval rating declining from 45 to 30 per cent between September 2024 and February 2025. The decrease in domestic support has coincided with heightened tensions between him and the now-impeached vice president, Sara Duterte, who is the daughter of Marcos Jr.’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte (2016-22).
The discord has deepened ahead of the country’s May 12 midterm elections, in which members of both the Marcos and Duterte clans are vying for key positions. These elections will determine the outcome of more than 18,200 government positions, including 12 of the 24 senate seats and all 317 seats in the House of Representatives, which play a pivotal role in shaping the country’s policy direction.
With three years remaining in the president’s term in office, the midterms will serve as a "litmus test" of the popularity of Marcos Jr.’s policies, including his more proactive response to the ongoing incursions in the South China Sea. Strong-performing midterm candidates are also likely to benefit from additional visibility and political resources, elevating their prospects for the 2028 presidential race. Thus, the midterms will be a preview of the “likely political landscape of competition” for the presidential elections.
For Duterte, the midterms will be a vital opportunity to consolidate her support for a potential 2028 presidential bid. Securing the election of pro-Duterte senators will be especially critical for the vice president, who remains in office while she awaits her impeachment trial. Duterte faces multiple allegations, including misusing state funds, failing to condemn China's aggression in the South China Sea, and plotting to assassinate the president and his family. A conviction would bar her from holding future office and halt any presidential ambitions.
The arrest of Rodrigo Duterte on March 11 in Manila — following the issuance of a warrant by the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity — has further intensified the political stakes for the Duterte family. Opponents of Duterte are likely to leverage the ICC investigation to weaken her credibility. However, public opinion regarding the former president’s arrest remains deeply divided. Human rights advocates and families of the victims have hailed the arrest, with grieving relatives of the victims gathering in solidarity. In contrast, pro-Duterte demonstrations have swept across southern Philippines, including a prayer rally that drew more than 4,000 supporters. With Sara Duterte’s trial set to take place after the midterms, her father’s arrest has become another rallying point for her to consolidate support and strengthen her defence.
For the Philippines’ allies, including Canada, the outcome of these elections will help gauge the future direction of the Philippines' foreign policy and outline the political landscape leading to the 2028 elections. If Marcos Jr. shores up domestic support, he would likely sustain — and potentially strengthen — co-operation with the U.S. and other allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, in countering Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. If the Dutertes and their allies manage to rally greater support and sustain political momentum through the 2028 elections, it could pave the way for a second Duterte presidency and a potential shift back toward China.
Duelling foreign policy visions
Whereas the Duterte administration directed the Philippines away from the U.S. and toward China, Marcos Jr. has realigned the country with Washington and has joined maritime ‘minilateral’ arrangements designed to counter China's coercive actions in the contested waters around the Philippines and reinforce the rules-based international order. In 2024, Manila became part of the “Squad,” an informal quadrilateral coalition comprising Australia, Japan, and the U.S. Other bilateral maritime and defence partnerships include an informal visiting forces agreement with Japan, military modernization support from South Korea, and an upcoming agreement with Vietnam (another claimant state in the South China Sea) focused on disaster response and collaborative maritime initiatives.
Marcos Jr.’s more assertive stance on confronting China's aggression has been well-received by the Filipino public. According to a March 2024 survey, 73 per cent of Filipinos support strengthening the Philippines' territorial claims through increased military measures in the West Philippine Sea. Public support for the Philippines’ increased deployment of troops and maritime patrols in response to the rising incursions in the contested waters has also risen in tandem with the growth of anti-China sentiment among Filipinos. Between October 2022 and March 2024, the percentage of Filipinos who viewed China as the greatest threat to the Philippines rose from 59 to 76 per cent.
This anti-China sentiment has shaped voter preferences in the upcoming midterms: over 70 per cent of Filipinos say they would be reluctant to support a pro-China candidate. A pre-election survey on voting preferences indicated that nine of the 12 contested senate seats are expected to be won by candidates endorsed by Marcos Jr., whom voters largely associate with continuing the administration’s firm stance against China. In contrast, only one or two candidates aligned with Duterte and his pro-China policies are expected to secure seats.
However, voters may very well cast their ballots based on economic issues, for which Marcos Jr. has a mixed record. Key issues include tackling high unemployment, improving health care, and expanding access to education. The president must also focus on addressing inflation and the rising costs of living, both of which have worsened under his leadership. For example, over the past three years, the cost of goods and services has risen by more than 10 per cent, with inflation settling at around two per cent in February 2025. Despite the decline in inflation throughout Marcos Jr.’s term, nearly two-thirds of citizens still say his administration has failed to effectively control rising costs.
Uncertainty about Duterte’s foreign policy proclivities
Despite her impeachment by the country’s lower house and ongoing feud with the president, Duterte has managed to amass a significant support base. In March 2025, 29 per cent of survey participants stated that they would vote for Duterte as the next president, placing her well ahead of two other leading contenders.
In addition, the senate’s decision to postpone her impeachment trial until after the midterms could play to her advantage. To be acquitted, the vice president would need at least eight out of 24 senators to vote in her favour. The delay in her impeachment trial and the arrest of Rodrigo Duterte by the ICC could allow the vice president to rally greater support for pro-Duterte senatorial candidates, potentially securing enough influence to avoid conviction.
If she is acquitted during her impeachment trial, the vice president’s policy preferences — particularly those regarding China — will face greater scrutiny, especially if she emerges from those proceedings in a stronger position to pursue her presidential ambitions. Thus far, she has remained mum on how she would approach China and the escalation of clashes in the South China Sea, an issue that became one of the impeachment charges against her. Some have interpreted Duterte’s relative silence on the issue as a possible indication of her attempts to improve relations with Beijing. In August 2024, she cautioned against defining Beijing-Manila relations solely in terms of maritime disputes, emphasizing the need for a “comprehensive approach” based on “shared interests and regional stability.” She also allegedly criticized the current government’s management of the maritime incursions as a “fiasco.”
Sustaining co-operation with Manila amid political turbulence
With U.S. President Donald Trump’s embrace of “America First” and his growing disinterest in Southeast Asia, Canada may choose to adopt a more proactive role in supporting its regional partners in upholding the rules-based international order. The newly finalized SOVFA underscores Ottawa’s commitment to the Philippines, strengthening defence and military co-operation between the two countries.
While closely watching the results of the Philippines' midterm elections and the ongoing power struggles between its political dynasties, Ottawa will need to stay engaged in supporting the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime rights against Beijing’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea. This proactive approach would not only promote long-term stability and strengthen mutual trust but also help solidify Canada’s position as a reliable partner for other Southeast Asian nations confronting Beijing’s expanding influence in the region.
• Edited by Vina Nadjibulla, Vice-President Research & Strategy, and Ted Fraser, Senior Editor, APF Canada.
