Réflexions stratégiques : L'impact d'un second mandat Trump sur la Stratégie du Canada pour l'Indo-Pacifique et ses relations clés en Asie

La version française est à venir.

Returning U.S. President Donald Trump did not wait until inauguration day to start disrupting trade relations. On November 25, 2024, he threatened to impose 25 per cent tariffs on all products from Canada and Mexico as well as 10 per cent tariffs on China, absent changes in immigration and a crackdown on fentanyl shipments into the U.S.

There is substantial uncertainty about whether tariffs will be imposed or will be set at the predicted levels, as Trump has made tariff and trade threats against many targets.  Nevertheless, his actions since the election indicate his continued enthusiasm for tariffs as a tool to address a wide array of problems as well as his willingness to play hardball with allies while also standing up to adversaries.

Trump’s first term in office proved a mixed blessing for trade across much of Asia. The export-dependent region has been deeply enmeshed in supply chains for decades. Much of the final outputs for trade in manufactured goods have been destined for the American market, which remains highly lucrative for Asia-based businesses.

Trade was also disrupted during Trump’s first term as the U.S. began imposing tariffs against Chinese imports, rising to an average level of just under 20 per cent by 2018.  As a result, firms that had been structured to deliver final goods to the U.S. began to look for alternate sources of production outside of China.

This pattern accelerated changes that had already been underway for some time in the region. Firms — including Chinese companies — were looking to implement so-called “China +1” sourcing as a way of diversifying risk and lowering costs before Trump took office in 2017.  The COVID-19 pandemic turbocharged corporate restructuring plans as companies quickly pivoted production to avoid border closures, manage surges in demand, and tackle supply shocks.

Much of the diversification pushed production of manufacturing, especially for parts and components as well as final assembly, across Asia. Vietnam was a particular beneficiary of these adjustments, with trade with the U.S. reaching US$745 billion by the end of 2024.

Vietnam, like others in the region, had been pursuing its own structural reforms and adjustments to drive additional economic growth. This included negotiating and bringing into force a range of important trade agreements, such as a free trade agreement with the European Union, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with 15 countries in Asia, and the expansion of Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership with the December 2024 accession of the United Kingdom. Each of these arrangements gave Vietnam-based firms solid access to key markets around the world, often with zero tariffs and improved services and investment access.

While Vietnam’s rising bilateral surplus in goods with the U.S. is likely to make it another early target for Trump’s tariff changes, the web of trade arrangements with others will help to cushion the impact of disruptions. Most other countries in Asia have similar interlocking trade commitments.

These economic ties will be strongly tested in the near term. Trump has a fondness for tariffs, but these will not be the only tool. Increasing scrutiny of inputs to manufacturing, especially from China, will be difficult and expensive to manage for firms in the region. Hence, locations that flourished during the first Trump term may struggle to be similarly successful in navigating choppy waters during his return.

La version française est à venir.

Irritants in the bilateral relations persisted last year, mainly centring around Chinese political interference investigations, ongoing geopolitical tensions, and new Canadian tariffs on Chinese EVs, aluminum, and steel. Nevertheless, Ottawa managed to reopen high-level communications channels and stabilize its relationship with Beijing. A surprise visit by Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly to China in July and the subsequent resumption of frequent flights between countries suggest, in part, a return to pragmatic diplomacy. 

The start of a second Trump presidency and an expected changing of the guard in Ottawa, however, will likely unsettle this nascent stability. 

Trump’s transactional, impulsive, and isolationist approach to foreign affairs, security and international trade — realms in which China remains America’s chief rival — will create challenges for Canada. Even before resuming office, the president-elect promised sweeping tariffs on Chinese exports yet expressed keenness to work with “his friend” Chinese President Xi Jinping to possibly solve all world’s problems. Attempting to align with Washington’s varying tactical manoeuvres towards Beijing could lead to greater uncertainty in Canada’s dealings with China. 

Ideology and democratic values are not important considerations for Trump, though his key cabinet picks such as Marco Rubio (for Secretary of State) and Mike Waltz (for National Security Adviser) hold contrasting views. Downgrading America’s strategic allies to transactional and pay-for-protection partners appears a real possibility. The U.S. will become a less dependable supporter for Canada as Ottawa navigates the challenges with Beijing. 

As the U.S. accelerates its retreat from multilateralism under Trump, Canada will encounter an evolving dynamic of increasing multipolarity and greater PRC presence in various global domains (economic, security, technology, environment and beyond) and international organizations such as the WTO and the UN. 

The need for Ottawa to co-operate more closely with European and Indo-Pacific allies will intensify if Canada plans to continue its values-based strategic alignment to counter China’s influence. On the other hand, Canada might still find common ground with China in preserving and reforming multilateral frameworks especially for trade and climate.

China watchers argue Beijing is better prepared to deal with Washington under the second Trump term. As the sole G2 peer, Chinese leaders seem ready to engage directly with Trump by potentially offering him “personal wins” while playing hard ball at the negotiating table. Swift Chinese countermeasures against new U.S. export controls on China’s chips industry signal a shift to stiffer pushbacks. Direct bargaining between the world’s two largest economies could come at a cost for Canada. Canadian farmers and energy producers may feel the squeeze should China agree to buy more American agricultural or energy products similar to the later abandoned deal made during the first Trump presidency. 

The Chinese economy will face strong headwinds in 2025 with notable implications for Canada. If China’s GDP growth continues to slow as forecasted, Canada will feel the pinch of flat international commodity prices and a lacklustre global market. While bilateral trade volume has grown steadily despite frosty relations between Ottawa and Beijing over the past years, new opportunities and barriers are emerging. 

In building economic resilience as a defence to Trump 2.0., China has introduced fresh incentives such as reduced tariffs to expand trade with third countries. Trade was featured prominently as China sought to improve ties with India, Japan, Australia, EU countries, and other Asian neighbours. Trump’s threat to slap tariffs on allies and rivals alike opens doors for China to generate rapport among developing and advanced economies, including Canada. 

A weaker yuan and Canadian dollar against the greenback and pressure to lessen reliance on the U.S. market could motivate the two countries to expand commerce in 2025. 

However, a new source of friction recently surfaced when the Canadian government proposed fresh levies mirroring the American position on Chinese solar products, critical minerals semiconductors, and other exports. Once implemented, they will predictably prompt retaliatory responses from Beijing. 

As domestic consumption remains soft despite recent stimulus and rumored handouts, Chinese leaders are determined to boost the country’s advanced manufacturing prowess (EVs, batteries, and solar components in particular) with a whole-of-society approach that could push added “overcapacity” into foreign markets. Additional duties on Chinese exports and flat demand for Canadian goods are possible scenarios for 2025.     

Given the greater capacity required to navigate the relationship with Canada’s most important trading partner, Ottawa, regardless of which party will be in charge, is widely expected to be left with squeezed resources to handle other international priorities. Canada’s China strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy may see a period of adjustment and potentially take a back seat especially if a more domestically focused federal government is elected. 

Keen to improve the “external environment” to support its economy and to soften the blow of additional American tariffs, China may demonstrate more openness to concede on economic issues and to improve relations with Canada. 

While challenges and uncertainties will likely endure, 2025 may also present opportunities to improve Canada-China relations. For better or worse, China and its multifaced impacts on Canada can’t be simply wished away. A thoughtful rethink of a long-term China strategy will serve Canada well for the years to come.

La version française est à venir.

In 2025, Canada-Japan relations will be influenced by at least three factors: 1) the nature of geopolitical change prompted by Trump 2.0; 2) Canada’s selection of a new prime minister; and 3) the longevity of the Ishiba Shigeru administration in Japan. 

First, the Trump 2.0 presidency will be defined by transactional diplomacy and a Republican brand that focuses on power, more equal burden-sharing amongst allies, and intense strategic competition with China, all of which will place inordinate pressure on Canada and Japan to align with Washington on diplomacy, trade, technology, security, and politics. 

In practice this means using the American economy and military assets as leverage to shape decision-making in Ottawa and Tokyo, specifically on China and Russia. Trump will push Ottawa and Tokyo to align their technology exports and trade policies with U.S. guidelines. This will mean carrots and sometimes sticks to encourage investment in the U.S., to adopt strict export restrictions on technology, tariffs against all high-tech industries that China has invested in its Made in China 2025 Initiative including EVs, environmental technologies, artificial intelligence, etc. It will also include demands on both Ottawa and Tokyo to increase defence spending and engage in security co-operation in more concrete and significant ways to contribute to the U.S. efforts to comprehensively outcompete China, the country the U.S. has acknowledged as its most “consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.”

Second, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s resignation announcement on January 6, 2025, paves the way for new leadership in Canada, whether a new Liberal-led coalition or a Conservative-led government. The former would likely lead to further atrophy in Canada’s relations with Japan and other Indo-Pacific states except in specific co-operation initiatives such as sanction evasions in the Sea of Japan or the use of dark vessel technology to deal with illegal, undocumented and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the South China Sea. The Trudeau government has been described as having “intellectual underpinnings clinging desperately to an old liberal internationalist order” and not being taken seriously in Asia.

Meanwhile, the latter — a Conservative-led government — is untested and would face significant funding restraints. It is difficult to envision how Conservatives would be able to quickly bolster Canada’s defence spending, reset badly damaged relations with China and India, and energize Canada-Japan relations. After all, simply being tough on China, defending human rights, and protecting democracy is a campaign slogan, not a strategy. Without a strategic vision of where Conservatives want to lead Canada, they will not be able to reboot Canada’s international relations, including relations with Japan. 

Lastly, the Canada-Japan relationship in 2025 is unlikely to get the attention it requires as Prime Minister Ishiba continues to battle conservative holdouts within his Liberal Democratic Party, a wobbly minority government, and a Trump administration that will likely see Ishiba’s diplomatic outreach to China as incompatible with Washington’s concerns about Beijing. 

Notwithstanding these hurdles, Ottawa and Tokyo should leverage Canada chairing the G7 to co-ordinate diplomatic initiatives that demonstrate their joint value to the U.S. This could mean co-ordinating joint statements and a communique via the G7 on technology restrictions, semiconductor production, co-operation on critical minerals and energy exports, economic security and resilience, cyber and disinformation co-operation, legacy munitions defence production, and recognizing Taiwan as a global public good. 

In short, Canada-Japan relations in 2025 and in the years ahead will be overwhelmingly influenced by the Trump 2.0 administration’s transactional approach to foreign affairs. Ottawa and Tokyo will need to coordinate their diplomacy to effectively lobby the U.S. to shape the Trump agenda. 

En 2025, l'Inde poursuivra son objectif de longue date visant à maximiser son autonomie stratégique dans un ordre mondial multipolaire en constante évolution. Les tensions avec les alliés clés continueront d'émerger. Néanmoins, les relations indo-américaines démontrent une congruence stratégique croissante. Le retour de Donald Trump à la présidence approfondirait cette dynamique, bien qu'il générerait des contraintes plus serrées dans certains domaines tout en allégeant la pression sur d'autres fronts.

Des observateurs sur place ont noté que New Delhi n'est pas aussi inquiète d'un deuxième mandat Trump que les partenaires traditionnels des États-Unis, et ce pour plusieurs raisons. L'Inde n'est ni un allié formel des États-Unis, à l'abri alors de toute accusation de parasitisme, ni un véritable adversaire. Une approche belliqueuse envers la Chine renforcerait les liens avec l'Inde, reléguant au second plan d'autres différends. Certains analystes soutiennent que plusieurs membres du gouvernement Modi préfèrent l'approche transactionnelle de Trump en matière de relations internationales.

Ceci dit, New Delhi cherchera à stabiliser ses relations avec Beijing. L'accord conclu en octobre 2024 pour patrouiller la ligne de contrôle effectif a momentanément désamorcé les tensions qui persistent depuis les affrontements violents de 2020. De plus, l'ambition de rivaliser avec la Chine dans le domaine industriel freine l'imposition de restrictions.  Les conglomérats indiens dépendent de plus en plus des contributions et de l'expertise des techniciens chinois pour développer leur production de véhicules électriques, de batteries avancées et de micro-puces. Cette dépendance a conduit à de récents appels à assouplir les contraintes en matière de visas et d'investissements chinois.

Ces développements récents mettent en lumière certains des risques auxquels seront confrontés Modi dans son troisième mandat et Trump dans son deuxième mandat. Les États-Unis connaissent actuellement un déficit commercial de 40 milliards de dollars avec l'Inde, ce qui pourrait amener à des demandes pour que l'Inde achète davantage de produits américains. L'aspiration de relocaliser l'industrie aux États-Unis et de sévir contre l'immigration pourrait causer des frictions. Les ressortissants indiens constituent plus de  70 % des demandes de visas H-1B aux États-Unis. Les divisions au sein de la nouvelle administration Trump, entre partisans de « America First » (l'Amérique d'abord) et les besoins de la Silicon Valley, détermineront si ces questions deviendront sources de litiges. 

Plus généralement, Trump a menacé d'imposer des tarifs douaniers de 100 % sur les pays du BRICS s'ils choisissent de créer une monnaie alternative au dollar américain.  L'Inde a répondu que de telles propositions aideraient à soutenir la multipolarité, faciliteraient le commerce et offriraient de la stabilité financière, sans pour autant s'opposer aux États-Unis. L'Inde ne souhaiterait pas accroître la puissance de la Chine, qui domine le groupe BRICS et le commerce international en général.  Finalement, le gouvernement de Modi s'attend à ce que Trump visite New Delhi durant la deuxième moitié de 2025 pour un sommet quadrilatéral. L'idée que Trump transformerait le Quad en un pacte de sécurité susciterait des désaccords, puisque l'Inde a refusé toute suggestion de cette nature jusqu'à ce jour. En clair, le Premier ministre indien Narendra Modi investira dans le renforcement des relations avec Trump  sans sacrifier les liens améliorés entretenus avec la Chine et d'autres partenaires clés pour renforcer son autonomie stratégique.

Quelles seront les implications pour les relations indo-pacifiques ?

En dépit des tentatives d'amélioration début 2024, la crise diplomatique entre Ottawa et New Delhi, qui dure depuis deux ans, s'est approfondie. En juin, le Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement a publié un rapport abrégé, affirmant l'interférence du gouvernement indien dans la co

urse à la chefferie du Parti conservateur qui a élu Pierre Poilievre à sa tête. Trudeau a déclaré que les investigations menées par la GRC sur l'assassinat du militant khalistani Hardeep Singh Nijjar en juin 2023 ont dévoilé  un complot d'extorsion, de coercition et de violence plus large, lié à l'Inde. Cela a entraîné l'expulsion du haut-commissaire indien au Canada ainsi que d'autres diplomates.  

New Delhi a catégoriquement réfuté ces accusations, réagissant en conséquence. Cette rupture contraste fortement avec la coopération de l'Inde avec les États-Unis, qui ont opté pour une approche différente, aboutissant à l'arrestation d'un ancien agent de renseignements. L'enquête de la GRC étant toujours en cours au Canada, peu d'informations ont été publiées à ce jour. Cependant, le poids des accusations a alimenté des heurts entre militants khalistanis et partisans du gouvernement Modi à Brampton et Surrey lors de la 40e commémoration de l'assassinat d'Indira Gandhi et du pogrome anti-sikh qui a suivi. Les leaders des partis canadiens, les députés locaux et les leaders communautaires ont condamné la violence, que Modi a qualifiée d'attaque contre les Hindous. 

Les perspectives d'amélioration des relations semblent être davantage affaiblies en raison  des récentes accusations formulées par la direction générale de l'application de la loi de l'Inde  à l'égard des écoles postsecondaires canadiennes. Ces dernières auraient exploité la délivrance de visas à des résidents temporaires à des fins de traite humaine. De plus, des rapports indiquant que des étudiants internationaux et des travailleurs temporaires étrangers d'Asie du Sud-Est subissent de l'hostilité, du racisme et des accusations d'être à l'origine de la crise du logement et de la hausse des prix sèment davantage d'animosité et de peur. 

Des commentateurs indiens pensent que la démission du Premier ministre Justin Trudeau et les élections fédérales printanièresprésentent une opportunité de réinitialiser les relations diplomatiques entachées Dans des discours récents, S. Jaishankar, ministre indien des Affaires étrangères, a souligné l'importance duCanada en tant que puissance regorgeant de ressources, et la signification de la diplomatie parallèle. À ce stade, il est difficile de discerner comment un nouveau gouvernement fédéral à Ottawa, libéral ou conservateur, pourrait résoudre cette impasse actuelle. En principe, un changement de leadership au Canada offre une chance de confronter les récentes transgressions sous un nouvel angle. 

L’identité du prochain premier ministre suite aux éléctions fédérales anticipées, et la question de savoir si les enquêtes criminelles menées au Canada seront menées à terme et donneront lieu à des poursuites judiciaires auront une grande importance. Cependant, il reste à savoir si la nouvelle administration Trump deviendra un allié ou un adversaire dans cette dynamique.

La version française est à venir.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) was developed to address, in part, geopolitical challenges that Canada is facing, notably in terms of China-U.S. economic tensions. The strategy’s main objective is to enhance Canada’s engagement and co-operation with countries in the region outside of China. In terms of trade and investment, the IPS seeks to increase economic flows between Canada and the region, especially with countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The long-term goal is to increase Canada’s exports and sustain economic growth while reducing its economic vulnerability vis-à-vis China and the U.S.

The main geopolitical change that Canada (and the rest of the world) faces in 2025 is Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency; however, it’s not fundamental in nature. Yes, Trump and members of his incoming administration have been making tariff threats to various countries, including Canada. In the meantime, the Biden administration has continued to impose trade and investment restrictions on doing business with China. The latter has even blocked the acquisition of U.S. Steel by Japan-based Nippon Steel. For its part, China has imposed export restrictions on critical minerals such as gallium and germanium, which are important for green technologies like batteries. As such, 2025 is likely to be just a more intense version of previous years in terms of geoeconomics.

Consequently, Canada’s IPS doesn’t need to change per se. What does need to change is the IPS’s implementation to provide greater alternative sources of imports and exports for Canadian business, which will suffer from the expected “trade war” with the U.S. 

Because of the uncertainty surrounding the Canada-U.S. economic environment, Canadian governments and businesses should devote more resources to exploring long-term investments on both sides of the Pacific to generate greater economic flows between Canada and its Indo-Pacific partners. Obviously, it will be more difficult for Canada to sell itself as a gateway to the U.S. in the coming years until some kind of ‘deal’ (either a revised Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA, or a separate economic security agreement) has been made with the Trump administration. That’s why it is key for Canadian private- and public-sector leaders to “sell” Canada as one of several alternative economic partners to China and the U.S. When relations with the U.S. will have stabilized, then the enhanced relationships built with partners in the Indo-Pacific region should pay off even more.

ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea are already working hard to reduce their economic dependency on both China and the U.S. At the same time, Chinese firms are looking to relocate some of their production to these markets, especially within ASEAN countries, to circumvent trade restrictions imposed by Western countries vis-à-vis China.

For Canada, these shifts create opportunities for trade and investment. For example, they offer an opportunity to develop and export critical minerals to the region for the manufacturing of semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles, and solar panels. Similarly, they offer export opportunities to Canadian auto-parts manufacturers. In return, they will make it easier to import these products in a way that reduces dependence on China and avoids tariffs on U.S. goods because of the expected trade war. On the other hand, Canada will have to remain vigilant when it comes to ensuring that rules of origin associated with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and CUSMA are effectively respected to avoid U.S retaliation for goods made by Chinese firms outside of China. Canada doesn’t want to be a conduit for restricted Chinese goods entering the U.S.

In addition, Canada should seek to conclude its trade negotiations with ASEAN in 2025. Ottawa’s recently concluded negotiations with Indonesia are a good sign that it is possible to reach agreements with countries in the region. Canada should also examine how it can collaborate with Indo-Pacific countries to lower tensions between China and the U.S. After all, none of the countries in the region benefit from the economic tensions between the two superpowers.

In sum, the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency is a not fundamental shift in geopolitics. Canada must push even harder in implementing its IPS and enhancing economic ties with Indo-Pacific partners (outside China) while ensuring that it doesn’t worsen relations with Washington in the process.